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CONCERNING THE DIALECTICAL CRITICISM OF RELIGION
Preliminary
It has long been known that the ground on which all religions that recognize the 
existence of a personal God can come to an agreement, is a kind of theodicy, which 
here, can be understood as a defense of the belief in the existence of God. In today’s 
world atheists are louder and braver in proclaiming their criticism of all religion. For 
various reasons, which I will not mention here, atheism is identified with rationalism 
and the names of these two worldviews are used interchangeably. Everyone who 
believes that the number of gods that actually exist equals zero considers himself an 
atheist or a rationalist. In addition, it is known that contemporary atheists evaluate 
all religious views in this way: as the number of gods people believe in gets closer 
to zero, the more rationalistic this religious view is. It would seem, then, that for this 
very reason monotheism is recognized as the last “bastion” of religious views, and 
within it - Christianity. This is the last worldview that must be criticized and com-
pletely removed so that the times of enlightened rationalism can begin. Monotheism 
seems to demand even more of rationalistic criticism because atheists believe that 
this religious superstition is most deeply rooted in Christianity, and when Christian-
ity is defeated only atheism is possible. That is why the Christian religion will never 
agree with rational and critical thinking according to atheists. In other words, the 
defence of Christian monotheism is something like “to be or not to be” for religious 
structures and organizations that bring a good number of temporal profits to many. 
I dare to conclude that the frequent criticism of Christian monotheism in vulgar, and 
thus colloquial. Religious criticism can be considered an argument that, in the eyes 
of rationalist atheists, conveys that Christian monotheism is the most rational of all 
known monotheisms, and is therefore, the “Trenches of the Holy Trinity”, or the last 
bastion of religion, behind which only the horizon of atheism extends. 
The essential meaning of atheism is therefore not only a simple negation of the 
existence of God (this type of atheism could be called a “world view”), but it is also, 
and perhaps above all, a break with religion which is somehow, according to athe-
ists, imposed and sanctioned by society. It seems that the latter meaning of atheism 
is emphasized today. In view of the above, the purpose of this modest article is to 
show the genesis and methods of the criticism of Christian theology in the context 
of modern atheism.
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In order to achieve what was intended, the path taken by atheistic thought from 
the negation of God’s existence to aggressive criticism of religion, especially Chris-
tian, will be briefly outlined. Furthermore, the ways this criticism is expressed will 
be described along with its potential effects. 
From atheism to the rejection of religion
Atheism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. However, there are at least 
three possible forms of atheism present in the thoughts of its representatives. The first 
one is a theoretical atheism, in other words one that is doctrinal. This typically consists 
of a general rejection of a worldview containing the viewpoint that recognizes the ex-
istence of God, and adopting, in its place, another worldview that no longer contains a 
theistic supposition. Another sort of atheism is called practical or existential atheism, 
or a “religion of escape”. This consists in a deliberate change of one’s point of view 
to one that does not acknowledge God’s existence because of a reluctance towards 
this particular thesis.72 Finally, the third atheism is a view which objects entirely to 
theistic beliefs and is both focused and based on this opposition.73 It should be noted 
that these atheistic views can be arranged from the weakest to the strongest according 
to the strength of their criticism towards religious views or religion itself. By pointing 
out that the ranking presented here does not coincide with the chronological order of 
various types of atheistic views in the history of religious criticism, one can, at least at 
this point, attempt to explain the individual forms of atheism.
It happens that theoretical atheism is a phenomenon secondary to philosophy. 
Instead of God the atheist usually proposes another explanation for reality, for ex-
ample: a materialistic one, a sensual one, liberal one, etc. Supporters of atheism refer 
to rational interpretation. They announce that this new worldview is inspirational, 
and the rejection of the existence of God is secondary and only results from the 
adopted worldview. The most popular version of a theoretical atheism seems to be 
materialism. Practical atheism is an expression of the rejection of the existence of 
a personal God for pragmatic or personal reasons. Practical atheists also have an 
attitude of conformism towards religion, which allows them to treat religion in an 
instrumental way, without sharing its beliefs. A few years ago, in Polish academia, 
Piotr Gutowski noticed that today the so-called new atheism is promoted by Richard 
Dawkins - publicist and evolutionist, the late Christopher Hitshens, Sam Harris and 
Daniel Dennett - an outstanding representative of modern philosophy of mind.74 An 
in-depth and intelligent study of this topic can be found in the book Ateizm urojony 
[Imaginary Atheism] by Sławomir Zatwardnicki.75 Contemporary atheism, known as 
72  See: S. Kowalczyk, Filozofia Boga, Lublin 2001, p. 19-21.
73  See: P. Gutowski, Nauki filozoficzne a nowy ateizm, [in:] Nauki przyrodnicze a nowy ate-
izm, M. Słomka (ed.), Lublin 2012, p. 20.
74  P. Gutowski, Nauki filozoficzne a nowy ateizm, p. 8.
75  See S. Zatwardnicki, Ateizm urojony, Kraków 2014.
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the “new” atheism, is the most offensive in its criticism of religion and devotes most 
of its intellectual potential of the thinkers who maintain this view. One may say that 
the criticism of religion is the foundation of that kind of atheism. 
It seems that a contemporary criticism of the Christian religion began at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, when religious studies emerged as part of materialism, 
a popular approach at that time. It was expressed in various forms, from factual and 
friendly criticism through explicit debate, to aggression against religion and its follow-
ers, including criminal sanctions, as was the case in at least a few places in the world.76 
Materialistic, and essentially atheistic, religious studies, by definition rejected God's 
existence, and therefore focused their attention on the criticism of religion. Michael 
Novak – the author of a book entitled No One sees God77, maintains that the “new 
atheism” is a set of allegations, not against God in whom atheists do not believe, but 
against all Christians. The new atheist, like every reasonable person, perceives injus-
tice and innocent people suffering in the world. But the arguments of theodicy, that is, 
natural theology, do not convince him. He does not blame God for such a deplorable 
state of affairs, because he definitely rejects his existence. Rather, he blames every 
believer, that in the light of such overwhelming data about the world the believer is 
still trying to believe, or worse, to convey this faith to others. The responsibility for the 
evil of this world, which the old humanist atheists shifted to God's shoulders, the new 
atheist shifts to the Christian's shoulders.78 And here is the proper moment to focus on 
some of the ways atheistic criticism towards religion is presented among atheists. 
Many religious scholars as well as many atheists admit that there is no objective 
phenomenon of religion that could be studied as a real, formal, ideal or social being, 
and would not be, at the same time, any specific religion.79 According to Andrzej 
Rusław Nowicki – one of the main representatives of Polish and Marxist Religious 
Studies – even the word “religion” is just an apparent name. Religion itself is simply 
part of culture, so its name seemingly defines some of the cultural activity of man. 
The dispute between atheism and religion is actually a dispute about values, because 
after all certain personal patterns are important in religion, which are personifica-
tions of values.80 When we talk about religion, we are really talking about people. 
People think that some things are sacred. They create a kind of bond with them, 
through which interpersonal relations are formed. In the first place a distinction ap-
76  See: M. Heller, A. Niekricz, Utopia u władzy, London 1985; T. Tindal-Robertson, Fatima, 
Rosja i Jan Paweł II. W jaki sposób Maryja przyczyniła się do wyzwolenia Rosji spod 
marksistowskiego ateizmu 13 maja 1981 – 25 grudnia 1991, Warsaw 1995; G. Górny, J. 
Rosikoń, Tajemnice Fatimy. Największy sekret XX wieku, Warsaw 2016, p. 144-157.
77  See: M. Novak, No One sees God. The Dark Night of Atheists and Believers, New York 
2008; S. Zatwardnicki, Ateizm urojony, p. 26-30.
78  See: S. Mirari, How Dialogue is done? A Review of Michael Novak’s No One sees God. The 
Dark Night of Atheists and Believers, “National Catholic Register” 2 (2016), p. 1-2.
79  P. Moskal, Religia i prawda, Lublin 2008, p. 37.
80  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów krytyki religii. Starożytność, Warsaw 1986, p. 25.
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pears between those who are “closer to the holy objects” and they use that relation-
ship to impose their will on those who are “further”.  There is, therefore, a division of 
the community, which over time develops into opposition in both groups. Of course, 
it cannot be assumed that this division is always developed consciously or intention-
ally. In the rich reality of religion, it appears as various principles. In uneducated 
people, religious ideas are more common and widespread. Among theologians and 
religious philosophers, we encounter systemic beliefs that are less common than im-
agined.81 In addition, one must not forget that doctrine is only one of the elements of 
the multi-faceted phenomenon of religion. Atheists themselves, apart from feelings 
and beliefs, admit that there are still desires and resolutions.82 Hegelian philosophy 
postulated that the more complex the reality, the more definitions it can define and 
the more it requires the use of a pluralism of methods in research. For this reason, 
atheists suggest that the method of studying religion is not so much chosen, but rath-
er created by the integration of many different methods.83 It is difficult to say that the 
atheist postulate has been honestly implemented in philosophy. Thinkers seeking the 
most appropriate method chose it rather than created it by integrating existing meth-
ods. Even Descartes did this at the critical stage of building his philosophical meth-
od.84 For this reason, the question remains open as to whether the critics of religion 
really integrate all available methods or choose those that are compatible with their 
intellectual strategy, which is already a worldview rather than a scientific element.85 
Even within Christian religious studies, it is believed that religion in general can-
not be defined. This is because in the systematics of religion we are not dealing with 
divisions, but with a typology, in which the main type is one specific religion, regard-
less of whether it is professed or criticized.86 An atheist critic of religion differs from a 
believing critic of religion in that the former fights all religions, and the latter - all but 
his own. Such an attitude would be a reduction of religion to a set of beliefs which, 
according to Nowicki, is not appropriate. As an example, a Polish atheist referred to 
Pomponantius, who claimed that either one religion is true or all of them are false. 
In contrast, Giordano Bruno, considered by Nowicki as a pioneer of rationalism, ar-
gued that every nation can have its own religion and every one of them will be true 
for that nation .87 The multitude of views on the issue of religion is a reflection of the 
multi-faceted nature of this phenomenon, as maintained by the expert of logic and 
religion Józef Bocheński.88 The multitude of views on religion, and therefore various 
81   A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 21.
82  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 19.
83   A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 10-13.
84  R. Descartes, Rozprawa o metodzie, Warszawa 2016, p. 16.
85  J. Wojtysiak, Filozofia i życie, Kraków 2007, p. 118.
86  P. Moskal, Religia i prawda, p. 25, 37.
87  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 34.
88  J. Bocheński, Logika religii, [in:] J. Bocheński, Dzieła zebrane, t. 6, Religia, Kraków 
1995, p. 40.
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options for approaching this issue, may in fact be positive for science, including reli-
gious studies. Thus, atheists come to the conclusion that criticism of religion cannot 
really be homogeneous, if only because religion is understood in various ways. In view 
of the above, several strategies for criticizing religion can be distinguished. They are, 
for example, distinguishing religion from superstition, criticizing anthropomorphism, 
demonstrating the existence of a deity or deities while simultaneously criticizing reli-
gion, which is a characteristic approach even for followers of deism, skepticism and 
agnosticism, ignoring religious content in cosmology, practicing “secular” ethics, op-
posing the existence of a deity or deities while altering religious content  (this can 
be found in Homer), and ridiculing religion, which is considered as an expression of 
courage and substantive criticism by atheists.89 Documenting arguments against the 
existence of deities is also a form of religious criticism. A sort of criticism towards 
religion is collecting and archiving all the arguments against God’s existence. Nowicki 
himself describes this activity as practicing “atheography”. This term was allegedly 
adopted even in Christian environments.90 Finally, an important kind of criticism of 
religion is “incontrology”, i.e. the description of the meeting of people or thoughts that 
have resulted in an intellectual development towards atheism.91 
The atheistic criticism of religion begins with a critical look at the objects of 
worship, here called religious objects. As for the criticism of an object of religion, 
its existence may be either questionable (e.g. God), or impossible to be questioned 
(e.g. sun). Or, it can be an object that is completely created for religion (e.g. host, 
relic). Such an item should be called a religious artifact.92 Looking critically at the 
objects of religion, the atheist may come to the conclusion that the object actually 
has no meaning of its own and is only a specific form of presenting an extra-reli-
gious meaning. If religious sentences are based on a premise about the existence 
of a supernatural world, they are either simply false or meaningless or allegorical 
at best, because they are really talking about the material world. Atheists recognize 
that the form of religion is only a secondary mystification of some non-religious 
content. Atheism would be a negation of this secondary form, i.e. the basic sub-
stantive condition for describing reality as a whole. According to atheists religion 
does not allow a description of the whole world, because putting some parts of it 
in religious “garments” is excluding them from the discussion and inhibiting their 
critical perspective.93 It should be added that, according to Nowicki, the subject of 
religion does not differ in essence from the subject of art. Religion would consist 
not only in the fact that a person believes in the existence of this object, but that it 
connotes it in a religious way because he feels fear or fascination for it.94 
89  A. R. Nowicki, Współczesna filozofia włoska, Warsaw 1977, p. 114.
90  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 56.
91  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 65
92  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p.15.
93  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 48-49.
94  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 16-17.
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According to atheists, the source of religion is exclusively the human mind. 
That which is contained in religion is equal to that which is contained in fairy tales, 
that people universally believe in. Belief in the content of a fairy tale or story turns 
this reality into a myth. Hence, religion is not so much imagination but beliefs. An-
drzej Nowicki states, in the words of Władysław Witwicki, that religion consists of 
suppositions that are “seemingly beliefs”, that are adopted despite contradictions 
with true beliefs. This is especially true for enlightened people whose true beliefs are 
incompatible with religious ones.95 However, it turns out that according to atheists, 
showing the natural sources of religion does not exhaust its criticism. For example, 
Shakespeare’s writings have their natural sources and people still read and respect 
them.96
Yes, showing the natural genesis of religion is sufficient to offset its rejection by 
rationally thinking individuals, but it is not enough to annihilate it. The dialectical 
method should be used for this purpose. 
From rejection of religion to its destruction
Andrzej Nowicki noted that selecting the proper methods has its roots in the 
Renaissance. Giulio Cesare Vanini stated that science, through its study of the world 
using specific methods and description, is to serve the truth. However, there may be 
two situations in which this task is not fulfilled. These are, errors and lies. If there are 
irregularities in the field of cognition, or if for some reason one of the accepted meth-
ods fails, then we are dealing with an error. The reliable antidote to error is practicing 
science, i.e. researching, observing, experimenting, learning someone else's views 
and arguments, comparing them with your own and assessing them. However, there 
is a second opposite to truth, which is a lie based on people's interests and goals. 
Then there is no room for science, this is an area of politics. So, it would be the wise 
man’s duty not to search for the truth, but to unmask the frauds and detect their lies.97 
This reasoning was adopted by Marxists and applied to religion. Thus, an incorrect 
social order is proclaimed as a good, religion defends this good, so whoever violates 
religion, harms the good it defends. In this way religion surrounds itself with a lie 
that proclaims that her critics are striking at the good of the social order.98 Such views 
in the spirit of Vanini need not only be rejected, but to be combated as harmful and 
destroyed as soon as possible.
To achieve this goal, one cannot emphasize an absolute contradiction between 
criticism and defense of religion. Sometimes honest criticism of some thesis can 
become its defense. As an example, Nowicki speaks in this way about the criticism 
of religion led by Gabriel Marcel or Jean de Lacroix. Dialectical criticism, which 
95  A. R. Nowicki, Uczeń Twardowskiego Władysław Witwicki, Katowice 1983, p. 34-38.
96  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 40
97  A. R. Nowicki, Vanini, Warsaw 1987, p. 45.
98 A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 43.
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is to end with the annihilation of religion, must begin with the transfer of criticized 
content into other contexts, because the sense of a given content is determined by 
the context to which it belongs.99 For religious content, these contexts should be, 
in principle, non-religious. Dialectical negation is not a simple rejection. Rather, 
it is a combination of affirmation and negation. Through this combination, what is 
affirmed is “absorbed” and is annihilated in its separate being, thus becoming part of 
the whole through which, it was absorbed.100 It is worth looking at the genesis and 
operation of the dialectical method of the criticism of religion. 
Its roots can be traced to nineteenth-century German idealism. One of its most 
prominent representatives was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who contributed most 
to the development and spread of idealism as such. Hegel maintained that the subject 
of knowledge in general, and the subject of Philosophy in particular, is a concept that 
appears as a perfect general object present in thoughts. And thus, it turns out that Phi-
losophy is a reflection of human reason over itself. To objectify these reflections and 
make them possible to communicate and be understood by others, it was necessary to 
apply the dialectical method of using pure, logical negation of the thesis appearing in 
the mind of the thinking subject. This negation in some way also contains a negated 
thesis. Hegel believed that the logical negation symbolically written as “non-p” con-
tains within it the proposition “p”, just as the statement “non-p” contains in itself the 
variable letter “p”. And so, the presence in one mind and in one time of both the thesis 
and the antithesis produces a certain kind "mental tension" allowing a creative synthe-
sis to be achieve, which is a certain novelty and an added value in the thought process. 
In this way thought develops. Nowicki mentions this, citing Ugo Spirito: “Each word 
[...] is an explication of everything that is implicit in it. In the act of uttering the word, 
all my reality [...] lives in this word and only in it. So that the word, living whole [...] 
must be an absolute. Conversely, the same word, since it has been spoken, becomes the 
subject of new considerations which focus on the new word, in relation to which the 
first word becomes a peripheral element. Therefore, the word is always absolute and 
always relative.”101 According to Hegel, philosophizing boiled down to the self-knowl-
edge of the subject and ultimately was to lead to the development of the idea of the 
absolute in the knowing subject. For this reason, the philosophy of the Prussian thinker 
could be identified with a religion in which man believes in himself.102 
What Hegel did in philosophy was then reformed by Feuerbach and Marx 
and successfully applied in politics. Marx stated that every ideology (including 
religion) is a “false consciousness” constantly deformed by historical and social 
class conditions. Hence the demand for a firm opposition to ideology, and above 
99  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 51.
100  A. R. Nowicki, Teksty filozoficzne z punktu widzenia ich przekształcalności, „Studia filo-
zoficzne” 1975, no. 12 (121), p. 77-90.
101  A. R. Nowicki, Współczesna filozofia włoska, p. 205.
102  S. Kamiński, Jak filozofowano?, [in:] S. Kamiński, Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii 
filozofii klasycznej, Lublin 1989, p. 39.
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all, religion.103 According to Nowicki, Federico Lombardi - an Italian materialist - 
aptly described the genesis of Marxist criticism of religion. Hegel believed that a 
concept that does not take into account all its reality, and therefore its historical de-
velopment, does not really describe reality. That is why the concepts contained not 
only the content but also the history of all their dialectical development. For this 
reason, the Prussian philosopher recognized as real only that development which 
had already ended. In this way, Hegel announced the end of history, philosophy 
and religion. Marx opposed the actions of the proletariat with the thoughts of He-
gel. He considered the present and future (and thus in a way the twentieth century) 
philosophy of materialism as a time in which many doctrines (including religions), 
which until now were considered dogmatic and absolute, would be exposed as 
ideologies, and thus false projections of the practical interests and human motives 
falsely elevated to a “philosophical heaven”.104 Louis Feuerbach and Karl Marx, 
included in the so-called “Hegelian left” introduced a new dialectical method by 
changing the Hegelian method. It would help in the inductive investigation of the 
development of the most general laws of the nature sciences, individual human 
thought and social thought. The change introduced by the two materialists men-
tioned above was, according to Nowicki, the funeral of “of what is ‘dead’ in He-
gel’s system, and therefore what is metaphysical, theological and theologizing.”105 
The dialectical method can be philosophically fascinating, because, as Henri 
Bergson wrote, “One can only know and understand to some extent that which can 
be discovered by oneself.”106 By applying the dialectical method consistently, even 
irrevocable truths are questioned. “On the one hand, if it is true that you cannot re-
veal the truth other than by interpreting and defining it, then it is also true that this 
interpretation and formulation is just a revelation of the truth, so it is not something 
other than the truth, but it is the truth itself as something possessed personally. [...] 
It is [truth - ed. B. K.] just possessing the truth and the more authentic it is, the more 
personal and manifold it is”107 The whole idea of atheistic criticism of religion is 
based on the understanding that the concept of the dialectic criticism of a view is not 
synonymous with its simple negation. A simple negation would be a mere shift away, 
a rejection of the view in its entirety; leaving it alone and risking its “return” in a few 
years.  Dialectic criticism of religion was ultimately meant to shatter it. This was to 
be done through the mental “absorption and annihilation” of criticized views.108 This 
“absorption” in the Marxist nomenclature is called “dialectical affirmation”. In the 
103  A. R. Nowicki, Współczesna filozofia włoska, p. 123.
104 A. R. Nowicki, Współczesna filozofia włoska, p. 128-131.
105 A. R. Nowicki, Współczesna filozofia włoska, p. 195.
106  H. Bergson, Myśl i ruch. Dusza i ciało, Warsaw 1963, p. 94.
107  L. Payerson, Prawda a interpretacja. Nie mistycyzm niewyrażalnego lecz ontologia nie-
wyczerpalnego, [in:] A. R. Nowicki, Współczesna filozofia włoska, Warsaw 1977, p. 205-
206.
108  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 51.
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case of religion, this consists in transforming religious content in such a way that it 
can be accepted by the mind of an atheist. An operation on religious views would 
be necessary. It would have to be an “amputation” or “extraction” of everything that 
is supernatural, thus, reducing religion to a natural or social phenomenon. Believers 
would have to assume that “primordial atheism” existed before primitive figures of 
religion such as magic and animism appeared, and consequently religion itself.109 
And so, the criticism of religion begins with the very ideological mark that 
attempts to define it. When it comes to religion, it has not had any supernatural con-
notations since the very beginning. Ideologically indifferent definitions of religion 
are used as an argument by atheists in such a way that those compatible with atheism 
are treated as objective, while those containing references to the existence of God 
are rejected as indifferent and biased. Attaching labels is usually undesirable because 
most often they ignore some features and causes of a given defined phenomenon that 
become subjectively determined.110 
Religion, according to atheists, did not have supernatural connotations at the 
beginning. The ancient Romans used the word religion to describe the diligent ob-
servance of required rites.111 They derived the term from the Latin word meaning “to 
bind”.112 Only Christian theologians, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, understood reli-
gion a little differently. Thomas treated it as part of the virtue of justice, consisting 
in worshiping God within the framework of justice defined as suum cuique reddere, 
that is, giving everyone what was owed to him.113 Zofia Zdybicka, in the spirit of 
Christian philosophy, defined religion as “[t]he personal relationship of man to a 
personal God whom man considers to be the final source of his existence and the 
highest good that gives meaning to life.”114 Schleiermacher, who had a positive atti-
tude towards religion, saw in it a certain expression of feelings, especially the feeling 
of an absolute dependence on the Universe.115 Atheists, for understandable reasons, 
tend to return to a naturalistic or sociological understanding of religion. Therefore, 
according to the definition of religion developed by Friedrich Engels, religion is “the 
fantastic reflection in human minds of those external forces which control their life, a 
reflection in which terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.”116 The 
critic of religion should not focus on the topic of its natural origins. The dialectics 
which begin from the critical affirmation of religion by atheistic views is supposed to 
result in the dying out of religion. However, this process will not end with the com-
109 A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów,  p. 45.
110  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 34.
111  Cicero, Pisma filozoficzne, t. 1, Warsaw 1960, p. 72; see: P. Moskal, Religia i prawda, 
p. 20. 
112  Re-ligere means to bind again.
113  St. Thomas Aquinas, Summ Theologica, I-II, q. 81. 
114  Z. Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, Lublin 2006, p. 299. 
115 A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów, p. 18.
116  F. Engels, Anty-Dühring, [in:] K. Marks, F. Engels, Dzieła, Warsaw 1972, p. 352.
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plete extinction of all religious activity. Although there are visions of a non-religious 
future of Europe, according to the spirit of dialectics and evolution, religion may 
take the form of quasi-religion as a “residual organ”. It could be, for example, a cult 
of reason or some other form of “spirituality without God”.117 
Summary
The purpose of this modest article was to show selected methods of the criti-
cism of religion used by modern atheists. Contemporary atheism, called the “new” 
atheism, is one form of the negation of God's existence. It is based on criticism 
directed against the followers of various religions based on the assumption of the 
non-existence of God and focused on the final liquidation of all forms of religion. 
The multifaceted criticism of religion, especially Christian, is associated with the 
multifaceted phenomenon of religion itself and the multitude of possible points 
of view about it. This criticism focuses on the object of religion, which is usually 
the object to which the cult is directed. It consists mainly in using the integrated 
method to illuminate the natural or social foundation of religion. In this spirit it 
is understood as an element of culture that emphasizes a selected part of material 
reality and “consecrates” it with the help of a supernatural halo and a sacred con-
ceptual apparatus. The reason for choosing the object of worship and its sanctifi-
cation are the psychological mechanisms of fear and fascination, which most often 
surrounds this not fully understood part of reality. According to atheists, the use 
of the mechanism described here causes a change in social relations consisting of 
a division and mutual opposition of small groups of people being closly related to 
the object of religion and larger groups that are not bound so strongly with the ob-
ject of worship. This mutual opposition becomes a “good” basis for manipulation 
and social engineering.
Atheists, however, come to the conclusion that the criticism of religion outlined 
above is not sufficient for its final destruction and displacement as a socially harmful 
phenomenon. In order to achieve that purpose, they propose applying the dialectical 
method created by Hegel and reformed by Feuerbach and Marx. This method is 
based on dialectical affirmation, or “absorbing” criticized ideology, and religion is 
recognized as such. This “absorption” consists in transferring religious doctrines and 
views from a supernatural and sacred context into a context free from this type of 
ideological baggage. Hence, the atheist adopts the concept of religion devoid of any 
spiritual element. It is thus critically negated. An example of a dialectical negation 
is Friedrich Engels’ theory of religion. Putting the concept of religion in an atheistic 
context will not cause its complete disappearance but will result in a post-religious 
synthesis in the form of new forms of worship and spirituality.
The modest size of this article does not allow for more attention to be given to 
this commonly used, dialectical critique of religion described above. I believe that 
117  A. R. Nowicki, Zarys dziejów,  p. 47.
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this is an issue that requires further research. It can and should therefore result in 
subsequent articles and studies of the issue raised here.
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Summary
A contemporary so-called „New Atheism” is one of the many ways the existen-
ce of God is denied. It is based on criticism directed against the followers of various 
religions. This criticism focuses on the object of religion to which the cult is direc-
ted. It is mainly about illuminating the natural or social foundation of religion. To 
annihilate religion, atheists postulate subjecting it to dialectical criticism developed 
by Karl Marx. This criticism of the concept of religion, although it will not make it 
disappear completely, will result in a post-religious synthesis which will appear in 
new forms of worship and spirituality.
Key words: atheism, religion, critics, dialectics, materialism
O ateistycznej krytyce religii
Streszczenie
Współczesny ateizm nazywany „nowym” jest jedną z form negacji istnienia 
Boga. Polega on na krytyce kierowanej przeciwko wyznawcom różnych religii. Ta 
krytyka skupia się na przedmiocie religii, ku któremu skierowany jest kult. Polega 
ona w głównej mierze na tym, żeby naświetlić naturalny lub społeczny fundament 
religii. Aby doprowadzić do unicestwienia religii, ateiści postulują poddanie jej kry-
tyce dialektycznej opracowanej przez Karola Marksa. Ta krytyka pojęcia religii, 
chociaż nie sprawi jej całkowitego zaniku, ale zaowocuje post-religijną syntezą w 
postaci nowych form kultu i duchowości.
Słowa klucze: ateizm, religia, krytyka, dialektyka, materializm
